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ABSTRACT
We reexamine the expectations theory of the term structureusing data at
the short end of the maturity spectrum. We find that prior to thefounding of
the Federal Reserve System in 1915, the spread betweenlong rates and short
rates has substantial predictive power for the path of interestrates; after
1915, however, the spread contains much less predictivepower. We then show
that the short rate is approximately a random walk after thefounding of the
Fed but not before. This latter fact, coupled with evenslight variation in
the term premium, can explain the observed change in 1915 in theperformance
of the expectations theory. We suggest that the random walk characterof the
short rate may be attributable to the Federal Reserve's commitmentto
stabilizing interest rates.
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The most prevalent explanation of fluctuations in theyield curve is
the expectations theory, which posits that the slope of theyield curve
reflects the market expectation of the future change in interestrates.
Numerous studies, however, present evidence that the dataare Inconsistent
with the joint hypothesis of the expectations theory and rational
expectations.1 Indeed, the rejections of the expectationstheory date back
at least to Macaulay (1938, p. 33]. who pointed out the implications ofthe
theory but concluded that "experience is more nearly the opposite."
Perhaps the most striking rejections use data at only the short end of
the maturity spectrum. Recently, Fain (1984], Jones andRoley (1903],
Hankiw and Summers (1984], and Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz(1983]
all conclude that yields on Treasury bills of less thanone year do not
obey the expectations theory. While stories of highly variable risk
premiums, changing asset supplies, or segmented markets might explain the
failure of very long—term yields to behave according to thetheory, such
stories seem less plausible applied to the markets for three—month and
six—month bills.2
Although the number of studies rejecting the theory Is large, the
results of these studies are not independent. Indeed, they examine almost
identical periods of history, primarily the 1960s and 1970s. theperiod
during which an active market in three—month and six-month Treasury bills
existed. It is reassuring that these studies reach the same conclusion.—2—
but confirmation requires examination of truly independent data.
In this paper we examine the term structure of interest rates at the
short end of the •aturity spectru. for the period from 1090 to 1979. We
divide our sample into different monetary "regimes" to examine whether the
failure of the expectations theory is robust. Our goal is to identify the
conditions under which the expectations theory works badly and the
conditions, if any, under which it works well.
In Section II we briefly review the expectations theory. The theory
posits that there are no expected profit opportunities. it implies that
the spread between the long rate and the short rate predicts the path of
the short rate.
We discuss the data in Section III. Prior to the founding of the
Federal Reserve System, the National Monetary Commission in 1910 collected
extensive data on interest rates and banking. We have extended the data on
three—month and six—month time rates through 1958. This data set provides
an opportunity both to reexamine findings based on more recent data and to
expand our understanding of the earlier historical period. We argue that
it provides a good data set with which to examine the expectations theory.
In Section IV we present tests of the expectations theory both
with the older data and with Treasury bill data from the 1960s and 1970s.
The results are surprising. While we confirm the failure of the
expectations theory using recent data, we find that the expectations theory
works •uch better during some previous monetary regimes. In particular,
for data prior to the founding of the Federal Reserve, the slope of the
yield curve has substantial predictive power for the path of the short—3—
rate.
In Sections V and VI we propose an explanation for the difference in
the perfor.artce of the expectations theory in the different periods. If
the term premium varies through time, then the expectationstheory will be
rejected using the standard test. The extent of the failure, however,
depends on the variance of predicted changes in the short rate. Weargue
that the relative success of the theory with the data from before the
founding of the Fed is attributable to the greater predictable changes in
the short rate.
In Section VII we discuss the role of the Federal Reserve and its
relation to the performance of the expectations theory. With the creation
and increased activism of the Fed, changes in the short rate became less
predictable and the expectations theory performed more poorly. We
speculate that the failure of the expectations theory using post—Fed data
may be due to the Federal Reserve's commitment to stabilizing interest
rates.
We conclude in Section VIII by discussing the implications of our
results for the expectations theory of the term structure under recent
monetary and fiscal regimes.
II. The Expectations Theory of the Term Structure
In this section we briefly review the expectations theory for one—
period and two—period bills. Let rt be the yield on a one-period bill, and
let Rt be the yield on a two—period bill. The expectations theoryposits that—4—
(1)Rt • 9 + Crt•
whereEt denotes the expectation formed at ti•e t. The current two—period
yield is anaverageof the current one—period yield and the expected one—
periodyield, plus a constant term premium, 9. The return from investing
in a two—period bill equals, up to a constant, the expected return from
investing sequentially in two one—period bills.4
Equation (1) is easily rewritten as
(2) (Etrt+j —rt)=—29 +2(Rt —rt).
The theory relates the expected change In the short rate, (Etrt+i —rt),to
the slope of the yield curve, (Rt —rt).In other words, the spread between
the long rate and the short rate reflects the market's forecast of the path
the short rate will follow. The test of the theory entails examining
whether this forecast is a rational one, that is, whether the market's
expectations is correct on average. More formally, we write the realized
future short rate as the sum of the expectation and a forecast error:
(3) rt+l =Ert+i+
wherevt+l is orthogonal to information available at time t. Equation (2)
becomes
(4)
where,according to the theory, a —'-28 and $— 2.under the null
hypothesis, theerrorter. in equation (4) is orthogonal to the right—hand—5—
side variables; ordinary least squares therefore produces consistent
estimates of the coefficients.
III. Data
We apply the test in the previous section to data from several monetary
regimes. Our first data set is on three—month and six-month Treasury bill
yields during the first week of the quarter from 19591 to 1979:2. As we
note above1 much research analyzes these data; we present results for this
period as a contrast to our results using data from 1890 to 1958. We end
this first sample in 1979 because the behavior of interest rates appears
substantially different since the Fed's announced change in operating
procedure in October 1979. In the last section, however, we return to
discuss the implications of our results for this alternative •onetary
regime.
Our other data are on the time rates available at New York banks from
1690 to 1958. In 1910. the National Monetary Commission compiled these data
from 1690 to 1909 by tabulating them from the Financial Review, a periodical
that analyzed current financial market developments. We updated this series
to 1958 using the Review and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, which
took over the Review in 1921. We examine in this paper the yields on
three—month and six—month time loans during the first week of the quarter.6
We divide the period from 1B90 to 1956 into four regimes. The first
regime is from 1890:4 to 1914:4, which ends at the founding of the Federal
Reserve System. The second regime is from 1915:1 to 1933:4. This second
regime ends at the introduction of the New Deal banking reforms, which is—6—
also th. approximate end of the classical gold standard and the approxi.ate
beginning of Interest rate pegging. The third regime Is from 1934:1 to
1951:1, which ends at the Accord, the agree.ent between the Fed and the
Treasury Department that the Fed would no longer peg interest rates. The
fourth regime is from 1951:2 to 1950:4. ending at the time when an active
market in both three-month and six—month Treasury bills begins.7
These time rates are the interest rates banks charged for loans of
fixed maturity. We believe these rates represent the equilibrium of a com-
petitive and large credit market, even at the begining of our sample.
First, lien York was the major financial center of this time, when there were
between 10,000 and 20,000 commercIal banks nationwide.8 Second, these
short—term loans were a primary loan instrument at the time. James 11976.
p. 61] reports that at the turn of the century most loans in bank portfolios
were short—term; maturities of greater than six months were rare. He also
reports [p. 643 that loans of fixed maturity were more common in New York
than loans without a definite payment period (demand loans). Thus, we are
studying in this paper the interest rates on a primary form of credit
during this period.
The expectations theory as represented in equation (1) is essentially
an expected arbitrage condition. It states that, up to a constant, the
expected cost of rolling over one-period bills equals the expected cost of
rolling over two—period bills. This calculation is exactly the sort that we
would expect agents obtaining these time loans to make. Moulton [1918)
claims that at least 40 to 50 percent of unsecured loans in major cities
were renewed at maturity (p. 707]; more than 20 percent were used to finance—7—
fixed capital Investments [p. 646]. Presumably, these debtors woulddecide
whether to roll—over short—term or longer—term loans on the basis of
expectedcost——precisely the calculation underlying the expectations theory
of the term structure. It thus appears ! priori that the expectations
theorywouldbe a good model for these time loan rates.
III. ThePredictive Power of the Spread
We begin by estimating equation (4) for the data from the 1960sand
1970s.Thefirst column In Table 1presentsthe result, which is similar to
that in other studies. We find a coefficient onthespread that, although
positive, is insignificantly different from zero. Moreover, the coefficient
is significantly different from the theoretically predicted value of two; we
can reject the null hypothesis that it equals twoatthe one percent level.
The adjusted R—squared of 0.01indicatesthat that the spread has negligible
predictive power. Contrary to the expectations theory, the slope of the
yield curve appears to contain no information about the path the short rate
willfollow.
We next go back in time through the various regimes and perform
the same test. Table 1 contains the results. For the subsamples from 1915
to 195B, we obtain results surprisingly similar to that for the recent
sample.The coefficient on the spread is always significantly different
from two and usually not significantly different from zero. The adjusted
R—squared Is always small. Thus, the slope of the yield curve appears to
exhibit no predictive power at any time since 1915.
For the period from 1890 to 1914, however, we obtain very different—8—
results.While thecoefficienton the spread is still significantly
different from two,itIs three times as large as the one weobtainwith
datafrom the 1960s and 1970s and almost twice as large as that from the
period immediately after 1914. The adjusted R—squared of Q.40 Is an order
ofmagnitude larger than any obtained with more recent data. Although data
from this period do not fully confirm the expectations theory, the slope of
the yield curve does contain substantial information on the path of the
short rate.
The various data sets suggest different conclusions. Confirming many
previous studies, we find that recent data provide no support for the
expectations theory. A similar conclusion applies to the period from 1915
to 1958. Data from 1890 to 1914, however, suggest that expectations are an
important determinant of fluctuations in the yield curve. Our next task is
to explain this difference.
Before turning to the explanation that appears successful, however, we
briefly discuss two possible explanations that are not consistent with the
data:
(1) As Miron (1984] discusses, interest rates exhibit a seasonal
pattern prior to the founding of the Fed but essentially no seasonal pattern
starting in 1915. One might suspect that the high coefficient for the early
period is solely due to the seasonal pattern. We test this hypothesis by
examining the non—seasonal variation in interest rates, a task accomplished
by adding seasonal dummies to the equation. Inclusion of seasonal dumies
has little effect on the esti.ated coefficient on the spread, implying that
the relative success of the expectations theory is not wholly attributable—9—
to seasonal variation.
(2) Another possibility is that the relative success of the
expectations theory Is due to the fact that there were major financial
panics in 1890. 1893, and 1907. One might argue that since the short rate was
only temporarily high, market participants should percieve this and make the
expectations theory work especially well. Separating the data into a
subsample including the panics and a subsample excluding them, however, does
not show any systematic difference in the performance of the expectations
theory.
V. The Role of Predictability
The essence of the expectations theory is that the spread reflects
expected changes in the short rate. It might appear that a prerequisite for
testing the theory is that interest rates be expected to change at some
point during the sample. Further, one might think that the absence of
expected changes can explain a rejection of the theory. This is not exactly
true, however. If the expected future short rate always equaled the
current short rate, then equation (1) implies that the spread is constant.
If the spread wereconstant,the standard errors of the coefficients in (4)
would beinfinite.Hence, the absence of predictability alone cannot
explain any statistically significant rejection of the theory.
Suppose, however, that the term premium, 8, changed somewhat through
time. In this case1 if changes in the short rate were unpredictable, the
spread wouldalwaysequal the term premium, 8•Estimationof equations (4)
wouldyieldan estimate of 0ofzero; with sufficient data, the hypothesis—10—
that $ equals two would be rejected. Hence, the absence of predictability
together with even slight variation in the term premium can in principle
explain an observed rejection.
As in Mankiw and Sumiiers t19841, we can show formally how variation in
the term premium can bias downward the coefficient on the spread in equation
(4). If the correlation between et and Ettrt,j is p. then the estimate of
converges to
2 02(Ethrt+i) +4p a(EAr.1) u(e}
+4o2(e) +4p c(Ethrt+i} °(°t)
where a2(x) denotes the variance and a(x) denotes the standard deviation.
If the short rate is not at all predictable (a(Etsrt+i)=O), then the
coefficient is zero. Moreover, as the variance of expected changes in the
short rate approaches infinity. the coefficient approaches two, the value
predicted by the expectations theory. Only if p is greater than or equal to
zero, however, is the coefficient a monotonic function, as in Figure I. If
p is negative, the coefficient as a function of the predictability of the
short rate has the shape in Figure II; it first falls from the origin, then
rises above two, then falls again to asymptote at two.
VI. Evidence on Predictability
The previous section suggests a natural explanation of the different
results for the various periods. In particular, it suggests that the high
value for the coefficient obtained for the 1890 to 1914 sample may be
attributable to a greater variance of predicted changes in the short rate at—11—
the turn of the century. To test this hypothesis, we examine a reduced—form
forecasting equation. We regress the future change in the short rate on the
current and lagged short rate and the current and lagged long rate. Table 2
presents the results.
Even with the more general forecasting equation, the short rate shows
no predictable changes in any subsample since 1915. The adjusted R—squared
never exceeds 0.05. Furthermore, the F—statistic for the null hypothesis
that all the coefficents, except the constant, are zero is never significant
at even the ten percent level using the conventional critical value.9 This
forecasting equation suggests that the short rate is a martingale. In other
words, the best forecast of the future short rate during the recent samples
may have been the current short rate.
As one would expect from Table 1. the short rate is substantially •ore
predictable in the 1890 to 1914 sample. The adjusted R-squared of the
forecasting equation is 0.41; the F—statistic is significant at the one
percent level using the conventional critical value. It appears that market
participants at the turn of the century would not have always expected the
short rate to remain at its current level.
Table 3 presents a rough attempt to measure the extent of predicted
changes in the short rate. The top row gives the variance of the change.
It shows that the short rate was •ost volatile at the turn of the century.
The second row gives the variance of the Innovation of the forecasting
equation in Table 2. The third row of Table 3 gives the difference of these
first two variances, which is a measure of the variance in predicted
changes.10 It Indicates that the variance of predicted changes In the short—12—
rate is substantially greater for the 1090 to 1914 data than for any of the
other data sets. Moreover, the variance of predicted changes is very small
from 1934 to 1958, the period for which the coefficient on the spread in
Table 1 Is negative.
Figure III displays the estimated coefficient from Table 1 together
with the estimated variance of expected changes from Table 3. This figure
vividly illustrates the high correlation across monetary regimes between
predictability of the short rate and the relative success of the
expectations theory.
We find further evidence on predictability in the spread between the
long rate and the short rate. From equation (2), we see that, under the
assumption that p Is not too negative, greater predictable changes implies
more movement in the spread. That is. the larger is the variance of
(Etrt+i —rt),the larger Is the variance of (Rt —rt).This test also
confirms our proposed explanstion. Comparing the last line in Table 3 with
Table 1 shows that the variance of the spread moves closely with our
estimated coefficient.
A simple univariate examination of the short rate also suggests that
there more predictable movements prior to 1915. Table 4 presents
regressions of the change in the short rate on the two lagged levels of the
short rate. Only for the earliest regime do we obtain a significant
coefficient. During the period from 1890 to 1914. when the short rate is
above Its mean by 100 basis points, one would expect a 5? basis point drop.
That Is, the short rate is mean—reverting. During any of the other regimes.
legged values of the short rate do not appear to provide significant—13—
information on the following change in the short rate.
Thus, the evidence from the various regimes appears consistent with our
proposed explanation: The term premium varies somewhat through time. Since
1914. the short rate has been approximately a random walk; this term premium
therefore has dominated fluctuations in the slope of the yield curve. During
the period from 1890 to 1914, however, there were substantial predictable
changes in the short rate; thus expectations played a more important role in
yield curve fluctuations.
VII. The Expectations Theory and the Federal Reserve
The failure of the expectations theory using recent data is a
consequence of the random walk character of the short rate.11 A similar
conclusion holds for the period from 1915 to 1956. Our results with the
turn of the century data suggest that If the short rate had, during recent
experience, fluctuated in a more predictable fashion, the long rate would
have moved accordingly. In their study of the expectations theory using
recent data, Shiller, Campbell, and Schoenholtz [1983] conclude:
The simple theory that the slope of the term structure can be used to
forecast the direction of future changes in the interest rate seems
worthless. Of course, some version of the expectations theory ought to
appear in the data if the Federal Reserve were to create a large and
predictable pattern of short—term rates. We merely claim that the
theory Is useless for interpreting the data provided by recent history
and that forecasting interest rates using the slope of the term stuc—
ture will only be successful if there is a break in the historical
interest rate pattern. (Emphasis added.)
Our examinination of data from 1890 to 1914. a very different monetary
regime, supports this conjecture.—14—
Our results on the predictability of the short rate suggest at least
two questions: First, why was the short rate partly predictable from 1690
to 1914? And second, why was the short rate not at all predictable from
1915 to 1979?
That the short rate was partly predictable at the turn of the century
is not surprising. James [1978, p. 142] documents that credit flows were
highly seasonal; interest rates also exhibited a significant seasonal
pattern. Moreover, during this period, there was no lender of last resort
that might stabilize interest rates in the face of financial panics or
other temporary fluctuations in credit demand. Thus, some changes in
interest rates during this period were transitory, making their path
somewhat predictable.
That the short rate Decame a random walk after the creation of the
Federal Reserve and remained so throughout the period from 1915 to 1979 is
probably a result of Fed policy. During much of this period, the Fed's
announced policy was to stabilize (or even to peg) interest rates.One
si.ple description of interest rate stabilization is
(10) hrt+i 0;
that is. the change in the short rate is zero. The data, however, obviously
reject this characterization of the policy, since the short rate did change
throughout this period. A second, less restrictive description of Fed
policy is
(11) Et £rt.1 s0;—15—
that is, the expected change in the short rate iszero. At each point in
time, the Fed set the short rate at a level that itexpected to maintain.
Under this characterization of policy, while the Fedmight change the short
rate In response to new information, it always (rationally)expected to
maintain the short rate at its current level.
It is of course difficult to judge whetherequation (11) is a result of
deliberate Federal Reserve policy without an explicit modelincorporating
the objectives and constraints of the Federal Reserve.Explicit modeling
of this problem, however, could easily producean equation such as (11).
Hall (1970] shows that individuals who desire to smoothconsumption and who
face a linear stochastic budget constraint will makeconsumption a random
walk. We envision a Fed that desires to smooth interestrates but faces
some constraint or has other objectives as well, such as inflationor
output. Depending on the nature of the Fed's trade—offs, itsoptimal policy
may well entail making interest rates a random walk.
If equation (11) does describe the policy ofstabilizing interest rates.
and market participants knew it was the policy, thenthe short rate expected
by the market would always equal the current short rate. Thespread,
(Rt —rt).would always equal the term premium, O. Fluctuations in the
spread would have no predictive power for the path of the short rate.Thus,
the failure of the expectations theory with data from 1960s and1970s, a
fact documented here and in many previous studies,may be an ineluctable
result of Federal Reserve policy during this period.12—16—
VIII. Conclusions
In this paper, we reexaminetheexpectations theory of the term
structure using data from different monetary regimes. In contrast to
studies using only recent data, we find support for the view that expected
changes in interest rates are reflected in the slope of yield curve.We
concur with the conclusion that expectations do not play a key role in
understanding fluctuations in the yield curve from recent history. This
conclusion, however, may be an inevitable result of the policy regime that
was then in effect.
Our explanation for the performance of the expectations theory assumes
small changes through time in the term premium. We do not, however, isolate
the underlying causes of these movements. Possibilities Include changes in
risk, changes In relative asset supplies, measurement error, and
expectations that are only near rational. The fact that the short rate has
been near a random walk for much of recent history implies that only a small
amount of such "noise" is necessary to generate the observed rejections of
the expectations theory.
Our analysis focuses on the short end of the maturity spectrum. While
three—month and six—month interest rates provide perhaps the cleanest test
of the expectations theory, the relation between short—term rates and much
longer—term rates (such as those for twenty year bonds) is probably more
important for macroeconomic policy. It would be useful to extend our
results to the market for such long-term instruments.
Our results have Immediate Implications for current policy discussions.—17—
First, since the Federal Reserve's announcement in October 1979, the
monetary authority has been less committed to stabilizing interest rates;
therefore, a more predictable pattern of short rates may emerge. If it
does, then the expectations theory may well appear again in the data, as it
did in the period from 1890 to 1914. Unfortunately, there is so far too
little data to test this conjecture.13
Second, our results lend credence to the view that policies that would
cause future short rates to be higher have an immediate effect on long rates.
This effect is critical to the common claim that the expectation of
persistent Federal deficits is causing long—term interest rates to remain at
a high level. While It may be impossible to document this expectational
effect using recent data, our examination of historical data provides
substantial support for this view.
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Notes
1.
See,forexample. Kessel (1965] and Shiner [1979). Flavin's (1983]
recent work casts doubt on some of these rejections.
2.
For discussions of changing risk premiums and the term structure, see
Bodie,Kane and McDonald [1983) and Campbell and Shifler [1964). Friedman
[1977) discusses the role of relative asset supplies in determining the
slope of the yield curve.
3.
Our working paper contains a data appendix.
4.
We discuss this linearized version of the expectations theory. For a
discussion of the linearization, see Shiller, CampbelL and Schoenholtz
(1963). Note that we can equivalently write equation (1) as stating that
the expected one—period holding return on a two-period bill, 2Rt —Etr+j,
equals the one—period yield. rt, plus a constant.
5.
The rates are reported as a range, which is typically 12 to 25 basis
points in size. We use the •idpoint of the range.
6.
We have also estimated the equations using monthly data, correcting the—22—
standard errors for the i.plied KA(2) residual. The results are almost
identical to those reported here. (While using monthly data appears to
triple the number of observations, the new data is clearly not independent
of the quarterly data. The increase in efficiency may therefore be small.)
7.
Similar results are obtained If we split the data at other points in
time.
8.
See James (1978, p. 25].
9.
Dickey and Fuller (1981] show that larger critical values are generally
required to reject a unit root. Thus, the true significance level is likely
even less than it appears in Table 2.
10.
The assumption of rational expectations implies that the covariance of
the expectation and the forecast error is zero. Therefore, we know that
Var(Art+i} =Var(EtArt,i) +Var(forecasterror).
11.
We use the ter. "random walk" informally. The data actually suggest
that the short rate is only a •artingale; it appears that the variance of
the innovation •ay be positively related to the level of the short rate.
This property of the higher moments, however, is not important here.—23—
12.
Whether the change in the short rate process is attributable to a
change in the real rate process or a change in the inflation process is a
topic for future research. See Barsky (1985) for one examination of the
changing stochastic process for inflation.
13.
When we perform the tests of the expectations theory for the period
since 1979, we obtain standard errors so large that one can reject no
interesting hypothesis.—24—
TABLEI
THE PREDICTIVE POWER OF THE SPREAD
Dependent Variable: rt+l —rt
Period 1959—1919 1951—1958 1934—1951 1915—1933 1890—1914
constant —0.03 0.08 0.13 —0.11 —0.57
(0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.14)
Rt
— 0.46 —0.66 -0.50 0.83 1.51
(0.37) (0.71) (0.22) (0.45) (0.10)
0.01 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.40
D.W. 1.78 1.73 1.77 1.88 2.08
s.e. 0.67 0.25 0.14 0.84 1.10
Notes:
(1)standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) The results for 1959—1979 use Treasury bill data; all other




Period 1959—1979 1951—1958 1934—1951 1915—1933 1890—1914
constant 0.33 0.40 0.16 0.38 0.16
(0.26) (0.21) (0.11) (0.34) (0.73)
—0.58 0.08 —0.05 —0.66 -1.40
(0.40) (0.90) (0.60) (0.46) (0.20)
rt_1 0.52 0.70 0.61 0.56 —0.26
(0.40) (0.78) (0.57) (0.48) (0.20)
0.68 0.02 —0.14 0.73 1.22
(0.40) (0.89) (0.50) (0.51) (0.27)
Rt_i —0.68 —0.90 —0.44 —0.71 0.26
(0.41) (0.78) (0.49) (0.51) (0.30)
0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.41
D.W. 1.95 2.04 1.56 2.11 1.92
s.e. 0.66 0.24 0.15 0.84 1.17
F—statistic 1.62 1.39 1.70 1.70 17.90
Significance
Level 0.82 0.74 0.84 0.84 0.99
Notes:
(1)Standard errors are in parentheses.
(2)The results for 1959—1979 use Treasury bill data; all other
periods use time loan data.—26—
TABLE III
CHANGES IN THE SHORT RATE; TOTAL, UNEXPECTED, AND EXPECTED
Period 1959—1979 1951—1958 1934—19511915—1933 1890—1914
Var(Srt) 0.4450 0.0628 0.0223 0.7292 2.3249
V.r(hrt —EArt)0.4316 0.0590 0.0214 0.7030 1.3760
Var(EArt) 0.0134 0.0030 0.0009 0.0262 0.9469
Var(Rt —rt) 0.0397 0.0040 0.0065 0.0459 0.4148—27—
TABLE IV
UNIVARIATE FORECASTING EQUATIONS
Dependent Variable: rt+1 — rt
Period 1959—1979 1951—1958 1934—1951 1915—1933 1890—1914
constant 0.35 0.32 0.14 0.37 2.50
(0.23) (0.20) (0.11) (0.26) (0.48)
0.06 0.10 -0.15 —0.01 —0.57
(0.11) (0.18) (0.14) (0.11) (0.10)
—0.12 —0.19 0.05 —0.07 —0.06
(0.12) (0.17) (0.14) (0.11) (0.10)
0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.28
D.W. 1.98 1.93 1.57 2.11 1.95
s.e. 0.67 0.25 0.15 0.85 1.29
Notes
(1) standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) The results for 1959—1979 use Treasury bill data; all other
periods use tire loan data.pun 8
2.
Figure I
Coefficient as a Function
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• 1934—1951
• 1951—1958Three xrnth rate
1890— 1 6.0000 3.5000 5.0000 4.5000 4.5000 5.0000 1890— 75.00005.00006.00006.0000 6.00006.0000 1091— 1 6.0000 4.5000 5.00004.5000 4.0000 5.7500 1091— 74.50004.75006.00006.0000 6.00004.0000
1892— 14.00003.25003.75003.50002.50002.5000 1992— 73.00002.50003.50004.00005.50005.0000
1893— 16.00003.50006.00005.50006.00004.7500 1893— 76.00006.0000 6.0000 6.0000 4.25002.7500
1894— 1 3.0000 3.0000 2.50002.5000 2.00002.0000 1894— 72.00002.5000 2.5000 2.00002.00002.7500
1895— I 2.5000 3.2500 3.25003.7500 2.5000 2.0000 1895— 72.00002.5000 2.5000 2.7500 2.50003.0000
1896— I 6.0000 6.0000 3.50004.0000 3.0000 3.0000 1096— 73.5000
-5.00006.0000 6.0000 6.00003.5000
1897— I 3.00002.50002.50002.5000 2.5000 2.5000 1897— 72.00002.0000 3.00003.5000 3.00002.5000
1899— I 3.00002.50004.0000 5.00CC 5.00003.0000
189B— 72.50002.5000 3.75002.75002.50003.0000
1899— I 3.00003.00002.7500 4.0000 3.50003.0000 1899— 73.00004.7500 4.00006.00005.7500 6.0000
1900— 1 6.00004.0000 4.5000 4.0000 3.00003.0000
1900— 73.25003.5000 3.50005.00004.7500 4.5000
1901— 1 4.50003.2500 3.0000 3.5000 4.2500 3.2500 1901— 74.0000 4.3750 5.00004.7500 4.5000 4.0000
1902— 1 5.25004.5000 4.0000 4.2503 4.50004.5000
2902— 74.5000 4.5000 5.75006.2500 6.0000 6.0000
1903— 15.2500 4.7500 5.25005.3750 4.5000 4.7500 1903— 74.0000 4.5000 5.00005.7500 5.7500 5.7500
1904— 14.75004.1250 3.1250 3.0000 2.50002.0000 1904— 72.37502.00002.50003.5000 3.7500 4.0000
1905— 1 3.1250 2.6750 3.22503.3750 3.2500 2.8750 1905— 73.00003.25003.62504.8750 4.8750 5.3750
1906— 1 5.87504.6250 5.62505.5000 5.7500 4.8750
2906— 74.75004.5000 7.7500 6.0000 6.7500 8.0000
1907— 1 6.75005.5000 5.25005.0000 3.7500 4.5000 1907— 74.62505.5000 5.75006.2500 14.0000 10.0000
1908— 110.00003.50003.50003.0000 2.3750 2.5000
1900— 72.1250 2.7500 2.12502.6250 3.37502.8750
1909— I 2.6250 2.5000 2.8750 2.6250 2.6250 2.5000
1909— 72.37503.0000 3.37503.87504.6250 4.7500
1910— 1 4.50003.7500 3.50004.0000 4.25003.6250
1910— 73.62503.87504.12504.6875 5.1250 4.0000
1911— 1 3.75003.1250 3.00002.8750 2.75002.8750
1911— 72.75003.1250 3.25003.5000 3.6250 3.7500
1912— I 3.3750 2.7500 3.0625 3.6250 3.25003.1250
1912— 73.25003.6750 5.00005.5000 6.0000 6.2500
1913— I 5.0000 4.0000 4.7500 4.2500 4.00004.3750
1923— 73.62504.9750 4.62504.62505.00005.2750
1914— 1 4.7500 3.1250 3.1250 2.7500 2.87502.2500
1924— 72.87508.0000 7.00006.50006.0000 4.1250
1915— 1 3.6250 2.8750 2.8750 2.7500 2.75002.6250
1915— 72.75003.0000 2.75002.75002.7500 2.5000
1916— 1 2.7500 2.7500 2.8750 2.8750 2.87502.8750
1916— 73.87503.3750 3.22503.37503.2500 4.2250flwee nonthrate,continoed
1917— I 3.75002.87504.12503.87504.3750 4.1250 191774.2500 4.3750 5.25005.7500 5.50005.3750 1918— 1 5.6250 5.62506.0000 6.0000 6.0000 5.8750 1918— 75.62505.87506.00006.00006.0000 5.8750 1919— 1 5.37505.1250 5.5000 5.62505.8750 5.6250 1919— 76.0000 6.00005.8750 5.8750 6.5000 6.5000 1920— 1 7.00008.25008.50008.00006.2500 8.0000 1920— 7 8.25008.62508.7500 7.75008.00007.1250 1921— 2 7.37506.75006.7500 6.7500 6.6250 6.8750 1921— 7 6.50005.75005.87505.37505.5000 5.1250 1922— 1 5.0000 4.75004.8750 4.50004.2500 4.1250 1922— 74.12503.87504.37504.62504.8750 5.0000 1923— I 4.7500 4.75005.0000 5.37505.12504.8750 1923— 7 5.12505.12505.50005.50005.1250 5.0000
1924— 1 5.0000 4.6250 4.8750 4.37504.3750 3.8750
1924— 72.87502.62503.0000 2.0750 3.0000 3.2500
1925— 1 3.87503.62503.87504.12503.8750 3.7500 1925— 73.87504.25004.3750 4.6250 4.87504.9375
1926— 1 4.87504.62504.8750 4.6250 4.0000 4.1250 1926— 74.1250 4.50004.87505.06254.7500 4.6250
1927— 1 4.62504.43754.43754.37504.37504.4375 1927— 7 4.50004.31253.93754.31254.25004.0625
1928— 1 4.18754.43754.56254.62504.93755.7500 1928— 75.87506.25006.50007.25006.8750 7.2500 1929— 1 7.62507.62507.7500 8.75008.6250 8.3750 1929— 77.37508.87508.87509.12506.0000 4.8750 1930— 1 4.8750 4.7500 4.5000 4.12503.6250 3.1250 1930— 72.75002.62502.62502.37502.3750 2.1250 1931— 1 2.3750 1.8750 2.1250 2.1250 1.8750 1.3750 1931— 7 1.6250 1.3750 1.62502.50003.7500 3.2500 1932— 1 3.5000 3.6250 3.3750 2.8750 1.8750 1.5000 1932— 7 1.5000 1.3750 1.3750 1.1250 .5000 .5000 1933— 2 .5000 .50003.0000 1.5000 1.1250 .8750 1933— 7 .0750 1.3750 .6250 .6875 .6875 .8750
1934— 2 2.1250 .8750 .8750 .8750 .8750 .8750 1934— 7 .8750 .8750 .8750 .8750 .8750 .8750
1935— 1 .8750 .8750 .8750 .8750 .2500 .2500 1935— 7 .2500 .2500 .2500 .2500 1.0000 1.0000 1936— 1 1.0000 1.0000 2.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.2500 1936— 7 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1937— 1 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1937— 71.2500 1.2500 1.2500 2.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1938— 1 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1938— 71.2500 1.2500 1.2500 2.2500 1.2500 2.2500
1939— 2 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.25001.2500 1939— 71.2500 1.2500 1.2500 2.2500 1.2500 1.2500
1940— 2 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500
1940— 71.2500 1.2500 1.2500 2.2500 1.2500 2.2500
1941— 1 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1941— 7 2.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500
2942— 1 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 2.25001.2500
2942— 71.2500 2.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500
1943— 2 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 2943— 71.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.25001.2500 1.2500Three nuith rate, continued
1944— 1 1.2500 1,2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 2944— 71.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500
1945— 1 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1945— 7 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 2946— 1 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1946— 7 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500
1947— 2 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 2.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1947— 7 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500
1948— 1 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1948— 7 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500
2949— 1 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 2949— 71.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 2.5000 1.5000
1950— 1 1.5000 2.5000 2.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1950— 71.5000 2.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000
1951— 1 1.5000 2.1250 2.12502.12502.1250 2.1250 1951— 72.37502.3750 2.3750 2.3750 2.3750 2.3750
1952— 1 2.3750 2.3750 2.37502.37502.3750 2.3750 1952— 72.37502.3750 2.6250 2.6250 2.6250 2.6250
1953— 1 2.6250 2.6250 2.62502.6250 2.6250 3.1250 1953— 73.12503.1250 3.1250 3.12502.1250 3.1250
1954— 1 3.12503.1250 3.1250 2.8750 2.8750 2.8750 2954- 72.87502.68752.68752.68752.68752.6875
1955— 1 2.68752.68752.68752.6875 2.7500 2.7500 1955— 72.75003.0000 3.12503.37503.3750 3.6250
1956— 1 3.62503.62503.6250 3.6250 3.6250 3.8750
1956— 73.87503.8750 4.12504.37504.3750 4.3750
1957— I 4.56254.56254.2500 4.2500 4.31254.3125 1957— 74.31254.31254.31254.32254.31254.3125
1958— 1 4.31253.87503.8750 3.9750 3.31253.3125
1958— 73.31253.32253.68753.68753.68753.6875
1959— 1 3.75003.75003.81253.81253.8125 4.2500
1959— 74.25004.2500 4.75004.75004.7500 4.7500
1960— 1 5.25005.25005.1250 5.22504.7500 4.7500
1960— 74.7500 4.7500 4.25004.25004.2500 4.2500
2961— 1 4.25004.12504.1250 4.1250 4.1250 4.1250
2961— 74.12504.1250 4.00004.00004.0000 4.0000
1962— 1 4.12504.12504.1250 4.1250 4.1250 4.1250
1962— 74.12504.1250 4.22504.12504.1250 4.2250
1963— 1 4.1250 4.12504.1250 4.1250 4.1250 4.1250
1963— 74.12504.2250 4.12504.22504.2500 4.2500
1964— 1 4.2500 4.2500 4.3750 4.43754.4275 4.5000
3964— 74.50004.50004.50004.50004.5000 4.6250
1965— 1 4.6250 4.6250 4.6250 4.62504.6250 4.9375
2965— 74.93754.81254.81254.93754.93754.9375
1966— I 5.3750 5.62505.93756.06256.06256.1875
1966— 76.33256.68756.93757.00006.7500 6.6250
1967— 1 6.81256.31256.18755.93755.9375 5.9275
2967— 76.06256.04256.28756.31256.31256.5625
2948— 1 6.43756.43756.43756.43756.4375 6.7500
2960— 76.7500 6.75006.81256.93756.93756.8750
1969— 1 7.25007.37507.37507.81257.9375Six nonth rate
1890— 1 6.00004.50006.00005.50005.0000 5.5000 1890— 76.0000 5.25006.0000 6.00006.0000 6.0000 1891— 1 6.00005.00005.0000 5.0000 5.2500 6.0000 1892— 75.7500 6.00006.0000 6.00006.0000 4.7500
1892— 1 4.75004.00005.0000 4.0000 3.7500 3.2500 1892— 73.7500 4.0000 4.5000 5.00006.0000 6.0000
1893— 1 6.00004.00006.0000 6.0000 6.0000 5.5000 1893— 76.0000 6.0000 6.00006.00005.0000 2.7500 1894— 1 3.75003.75003.5000 3.00003.0000 3.0000 1894— 73.0000 3.2500 3.7500 3.00003.0000 3.2500
2895— 1 3.25004.00004.2500 4.50003.2500 2.7500 1895— 72.7500 2.87502.8750 3.75003.7500 4.2500 1896— 1 6.00006.00004.0000 4.7500 3.5000.3.5000 2896— 74.0000 5.7500 6.0000 6.0000 6.0000 4.0000
1897— 1 3.50003.0000 3.0000 3.5000 3.0000 3.0000 1897— 73.0000 3.0000 3.75004.7500 3.7500 3.5000 1898— I 3.7500 3.0000 4.0000 5.00005.0000 3.0000 1898— 73.50003.25004.00003.2500 3.0000 3.5000 1899— 1 3.0000 3.0000 3.7500 4.25003.8750 3.5000 1899— 73.50004.75004.7500 6.0000 6.0000 6.0000 1900— I 6.0000 4.2500 4.7500 4.00004.0000 4.0000 1900— 74.25004.25004.0000 5.00004.7500 4.7500 1901— I 4.50003.50003.5000 3.7500 4.75004.0000 2902— 74.50004.75004.7500 4.75004.5000 4.3750 1902— 1 5.25004.75004.3750 4.00004.25004.5000 1902— 74.50004.8750 5.00006.00005.5000 5.8750
1903— 1 5.37504.75005.2500 5.37504.75005.2500 1903— 75.0000 5.50005.7500 5.7500 5.7500 5.7500
1904— 1 4.75004.37504.0000 3.87503.37503.1250 1904— 73.37503.50003.5000 3.75003.7500 3.8750
1905— 1 3.37503.12503.5000 3.6250 3.6250 3.5000 1905— 73.62503.75004.1250 4.62505.12505.0000
1906— 1 5.6250 4.6250 4.3750 5.2500 5.7500 4.8750 1906— 75.62505.62506.5000 6.00006.00006.2500 1907— 1 6.2500 5.62505.6250 5.2500 4.5000 4.7500 1907— 75.75006.12506.0000 6.25006.00007.0000 2908— 2 6.0000 4.62504.3750 4.0000 3.62503.5000 1908— 73.5000 3.8750 3.6250 3.5000 3.7500 2.5000
1909— I 3.3750 3.0000 3.2250 3.00002.87503.1250 2909— 73.3750 3.87503.8750 4.25004.37504.3750 1910— 1 4.5000 4.1250 3.87504.12504.2500 4.1250 1910— 74.50005.00004.8750 4.62504.87504.0000 1921— 1 3.8750 3.62503.3750 3.1250 3.0000 3.3750 1911— 73.56253.93753.8750 3.87503.62503.7500
1912— 1 3.62503.12503.3750 3.8750 3.50003.5000 1912— 74.1250 4.8750 5.1250 5.37505.7500 5.7500
1913— 1 4.75004.37504.7500 4.25004.37505.3750 1913— 75.3750 5.87505.00004.75004.8750 4.8750
1914— 1 4.75003.50003.3750 3.00003.37503.0000 2914— 73.8750 6.00007.5000 6.50005.7500 4.1250
1925— 1 3.8750 3.2500 3.2500 3.25003.25003.1250 1915— 73.1250 3.50003.12503.0000 3.12502.7500 1916— I3.00003.0000 3.1250 3.00003.12503.1250 2916— 74.0000 3.87503.6250 3.5000 3.37504.1250Six nonth rate, continued
1917— 13.75003.12504.22504.12504.62504.6250
192?—74.62504.62505.37504.75005.62505.6250
1928— 1 5.75005.8750 6.00006.0000 6.0000 6.0000
1918— 75.8750 5.8750 6.0000 6.0000 6.00006.0000
1919— 1 5.75005.25005.62505.6250 5.7500 5.6250
1919— 76.0000 6.0000 5.8750 5.B750 6.50006,5000
1920— 1 7.30008.25008.50008.5000 8.2500 8.0000
1920— 78.2500 8.3750 8.75007.75007.97506.2500
1921— 1 7.12506.62506.62506.6250 6.5000 6.6250
1921— 76.2500 5.8750 5.8750 5.6250 5.50005.1250
1922— 1 5.00004.75004.87504.6250 4.3750 4.2500
1922— 74.2500 4.2500 4.50004.8750 4.87505.0000
1923— 1 4.75004.75005.00005.3750 5.3750 5.0000
1923— 75.1250 5.1250 5.50005.5000 5.12505.0000
1924— 1 5.00004.62504.87504.6250 4.6250 4.1250
1924— 73.2500 3.5000 3.3750 3.1230 3.37503.6250
1925— 2 3.87503.87504.25004.2500 3.9750 3.9750
1925— 73.93754.56254.62504.7500 4.87504.9375
1926— 1 4.87504.62504.87504.6250 4.1250 4.1250
1926— 74.1250 4.6250 4.8750 5.0625 4.87504.6250
1927— 2 4.62504.50004.43754.43754.43754.4375
1927— 74.56254.50004.31254.32254.31254.1875
1928— 2 4.18754.50004.56254.81254.9375 5.7500
1928— 75.87506.25006.5000 7.0000 6.75007.1250
1929— 2 7.62507.62507.75008.5000 8.5000 G.3750
1929— 77.62508.8750 8.87509.1250 5.87504.8750
1930— 1 4.8750 4.8750 4.5000 4.1250 3.87503.6250
2930— 73.00003.1250 3.12502.75002.75002.6250
1931— I 2.8750 2.37502.6250 2.3750 2.3750 1.8750
1931— 7 1.8750 1.8750 1.87502.75003.75003.2500
1932— 2 3.50003.62503.37502.8750 1.8750 1.5000
2932— 7 1.5000 1.3750 1.3750 1.1250 1.0000 1.0000
1933— I .8750 .87503.0000 1.8750 1.2500 1.2500
2933— 7 1.1250 1.7500 1.1250 .8750 .68751.0000
1934— 1 1.3750 1.3750 1.1250 1.1250 1.1250 1.1250
1934— 7 1.1250 1.1250 2.2250 1.1250 1.1250 1.1250
1935— 1 1.1250 1.1250 1.1250 1.1250 .3750 .2500
1935— 7 .2500 .2500 .2500 .2500 1.0000 1.0000
1936— I 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.2500
1936— 72.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 2.2500 2.2500
1937— 1 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.2500 1.5000 1.5000
1937— 7 2.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000
1938— 1 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000
1938— 7 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000
1939— 1 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000
1939— 7 1.5000 1.5000 2.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000
1940— 1 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 2.5000
1940— 71.5000 1.5000 2.5000 2.5000 1.5000 1.5000
1941— 1 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000
1941— 71.5000 1.5000 1.5000 2.5000 2.5000 1.5000
1942— 1 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000
1942— 71.5000 2.5000 1.5000 2.5000 2.5000 1.5000
2943— 1 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000
1943— 71.5000 1.5000 1.5000 2.5000 2.5000 1.5000Six nonth rate,cathiued
1944— 1 2.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 2944— 7 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1945— I 1.5000 1.5000 2.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1945— 7 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 l.500Q 1946— 1 1.5000 1.5000 2.5000 1.5000 1.5000 2.5000 1946— 7 2.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1947— 1 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1947— 7 1.5000 2.5000 1.5000 2.5000 1.5000 2.5000 1949— 1 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1948— 7 1.5000 1.5000 2.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1949— I 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 1949— 7 1.5000 1.5000 1.5000 3.5000 1.7500 1.7500 1950— I 2.7500 1.7500 1.7500 1.7500 1.7500 1.7500 1950— 7 1.7500 1.7500 1.7500 1.7500 1.7500 3.7500 1951— 1 2.75002.18752.18752.18752.18752.1875 1951— 72.50002.50002.50002.50002.5000 2.5000 1952— 1 2.50002.50002.5000 2.50002.5000 2.5000 1952— 72.50002.50002.62502.62502.6250 2.6250 1953— 1 2.62502.6250 2.6250 2.62502.6250 3.1250 1953— 73.12503.12503.2250 3.1250 3.1250 3.1250 1954— 1 3.12503.1250 3.1250 2.87502.875028750 1954— 72.87502.68752.68752.68752.68752.6875 3755— 1 2.68752.68752.68752.6875 2.7500 2.7500 1955— 72.7500 3.0000 3.1250 3.37503.3750 3.6250 1956— 1 3.6250 3.62503.6250 3.62503.6250 3.8750 1956— 7 3.87503.87504.12504.37504.3750 4.3750 1957— I 4.56254.56254.43754.43754.43754.4375 1957— 74.43754.43754.43754.43754.43754.4375 1958— I 4.43753.87503.8750 3.87503.2500 3.2500 1958— 73.25003.25003.69753.69753.69753.6875 1959— 1 3.75003.75003.83253.81253.8125 4.2500 3959— 74.31254.31254.7500 4.75004.7500 4.7500 1960— I 5.25005.25005.1250 5.12504.7500 4.7500 1960— 74.75004.75004.25004.25004.2500 4.2500 1961— 1 4.2500 4.1250 4.1250 4.12504.12504.1250 1961— 7 4.22504.32504.0000 4.00004.0000 4.0000 3962— 1 4.1250 4.1250 4.12504.12504.12504.1250 1962— 74.12504.32504.3250 4.12504.12504.1250 1963— 2 4.12504.12504.1250 4.12504.12504.1250 1963— 74.1250 4.12504.12504.12504.43754.4375 1964— 1 4.2500 4.25004.37504.43754.43754.5000 1764— 74.50004.50004.5000 4.50004.50004.6250 1965— 1 4.6250 4.62504.6250 4.6250 4.62504.9375 1965— 74.93754.81254.81254.93754.93754.9375 1966— 1 5.3750 5.62505.93756.06256.06256.1875 1966— 75.83256.68756.93757.00006.75006.6250
1967— 1 6.81256.31256.18755.93755.93755.9375 1967- 74.06256.06256.18756.32256.31256.5425 1968— 1 6.43756.43756.43756.43756.4375 6.7500 1960— 76.75006.75006.81256.93756.93756.8750
1969— 1 7.2500 7.37507.37507.81257.9375